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Dominant Forms of Corporate Control in
the U.S. Agribusiness Sector
Julie A. Caswell
Two forms of control over corporate decision making are analyzed: direct control
through stockholding and network control through interlocking boards of directors. A
majority of the 222 large agribusiness firms studied had strong direct control by
owners or cooperatives, while the largest firms lacked such control. Tests relating
direct control type to level of network control exposure show that strong direct
control is associated with weak network control and vice versa, with firm size being
the major factor in explaining both types of control. For the largest firms,
network-based rather than direct control appears to limit management discretion.

Key words: agribusiness, corporate control, management, network analysis.

The evident spread of managerial controlcontrol patterns may also have a dynamic efamong large U.S. corporations in the fifty
fect on aggregate concentration if they in-

years since Berle and Means' initial study has
fluence the internal and merger growth rates of
prompted extensive theoretical and empirical
large firms.
study of the effect of type of corporate control The potential impacts of corporate control
on firm performance and aggregate concentraon firm-level efficiency and quality of decision
tion. Models of firm behavior under managemaking argue for the development of accurate
ment control have predicted that these firms
data on its dominant forms in the economy
may have lower profits and greater organizaand its sectors.1 In the agribusiness sector, the
tional slack, put sales growth before profit
relevant universe for measuring dominant
growth, and/or seek the quiet life of low risk,
forms of corporate control includes the large
status quo operations (Williamson, Baumol, public, private, and cooperative firms. A uniMarris). Empirical evidence on these effects verse
is
including 222 of these large firms oper-

mixed. For example, while several studiesating in 1976 is used in this analysis. Two

show lower profit rates for managerially conseparate avenues of corporate control are
trolled firms, others, including the most careinvestigated: direct control over firm decision

fully specified test, show no significant differ-making through stockholding and network

ence between control types (Scherer, p. 39).
control exercised through interlocking memHowever, the reliability of these findings
bership on boards of directors. In this concephinges on control data and classifications that
tual framework, corporate control is the
vary widely in quality.
power to determine the broad policies, objecCorporate control patterns may affecttives, and business strategies of the firm. It is
aggregate concentration by reducing the indeexercised through controlling the decisionpendence of decision making in firms with
making hierarchy of the firm, in particular the
strong ties to outside centers of power. This
board of directors, which in turn controls the

effect was recognized in the debate preceding
internal organization of the firm.
passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, although The first avenue of corporate control reflects the familiar notion that actual ownerthe scope of Section 8 was ultimately limited
to outlawing interlocking directors betweenship of the firm or a significant interest in

direct competitors (Halverson). Corporate
it usually confers decision-making control.

1 Most previous studies have investigated corporate control for
Julie A. Caswell is an assistant professor, Department of Agricul-broad cross sections of the largest firms in the economy instead of

tural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts. by sector as occurs here. The exceptions are U.S. Congress (SenThe author wishes to thank W. F. Mueller and two anonymous
ate), Ware, and Schulman who used the Corporate Data Exchange

referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

data set.

Copyright 1987 American Agricultural Economics Association

12

February

1987

Amer.

J.

Agr.

Econ.

Large, modern firms
are
also
to
the Corporate
Data Exchange
(CDE)subject
in pubinfluence (and possible
control)
of other
lishing its Stock
Ownership Directorytities that have a stake
inThe
the
Agribusiness.
sample firm's
firms representoperat
the
even if they are not
stockhol
leading significant
agricultural input manufacturers
(maThese include financial
institutions,
chinery, feed,
chemicals), cooperatives (sup- supp
buyers, regional ply
interests,
and others
and marketing), food manufacturers,
ressearch seeking to quantify
this
second
av
taurant chains, wholesalers,
and retailers
in

of control has focused on seats held on the

the United States in 1976.2 Nearly three-

firm's board of directors by representatives
of of them are large, with operating revefourths
nues
greater than $500 million, while 50%
other firms. Such representation has been
pervasive and stable over time in the United
have operating revenues greater than $1 bilStates (Dooley, Allen, Mizruchi). Network
lion. The CDE directory lists all voters of at
control indexes are used to measure the levels
least 0.2% of a company's stock as of 31 Deand patterns of this contact in order to assess
cember 1976 for the 153 widely traded firms in
its effect on corporate control.
the sample and all major holders in the remaining 69 firms.
Before proceeding, the application of netThe directory is used in two ways in this
work analysis to corporate control is briefly
discussed. Network analysis is emerging asstudy: (a) to classify individual firms under
of direct control based on the size
the primary conceptual framework and setcategories
of
of their largest stockholdings and (b) to define
empirical methods in the social sciences for

the limits of the network of firms and instituanalyzing complex sets of relational data
(Knoke and Kuklinski). Its development was
tions that are included in the analysis of board
The relevant network is the
motivated by the limitations of trying representation.
to
understand economic and social phenomena
222 agribusiness firms and any other firms or

institutions that might seek to control or insolely by studying the attributes of individual
fluence them through board representation.
actors apart from their relationships with
other actors. This would be analogous toWhile this latter group might include any organization in the economy, the network is limevaluating the profit performance of a cereal
ited to all organizations that have displayed an
manufacturer by studying only its own size,
cost structure, and other attributes while iginterest in the sector through stockholdings of
any size in the sample agribusiness firms. The
noring similar attributes of its competitors,
CDE stockholding directory is used to identify
their business strategies, and other market
factors. As this example indicates, neither 216
the such organizations. Twenty-seven Fortune Top 50 commercial banks and life insurattribute nor relational approach alone is
likely to yield a satisfactory understandingance
of companies that were not agribusiness
stockholders
economic or social phenomena (Knoke and

are also included in order to

comprehensively cover these types of firms.
Kuklinski, p. 10).
Since data on board membership for 10 of the
The size of direct stockholdings is an attriagribusiness firms could not be found, the netbute of the firm that explains its type of corpowork studied contains 455 firms.3
rate control. While previous studies have

The data set on board representation for the
stopped here in analyzing control (Schulman,
network analysis was constructed by coding
Kotz, Larner, Berle and Means), such an analthe company, name, and position held for the
ysis remains incomplete because the relational
officers and directors of the 455 companies.
context of board representation is ignored.
This set contained nearly 12,000 listings.
The empirical techniques of network analysis
Names were then matched to generate records
are applied here to relational data on board
of company contacts through individuals using
representation in order to qualify and clarify
conclusions drawn from a simple attribute or
stockholding-based analysis of corporate con2 Representative firms include Deere and Ciba-Geigy (inputs);

trol.

The Study's Data Base

Agway and Sunkist (cooperatives); Beatrice, American Bakeries,
and Gallo Winery (food manufacturers); McDonald's and Howard
Johnson (restaurant chains); Super Valu and Wetterau (wholesalers); and Safeway and Lucky (retailers). A complete list of the
sample firms is available from the author.

3 Of the 10 excluded agribusiness firms, 7 were privately owned

The sample of 222 agribusiness firms and the

stockholding data base were constructed by

(6 domestic and 1 foreign), 2 were cooperatives, and 1 was a
foreign, publicly owned firm. A complete list of the 455 network

firms is available from the author.
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making.
A firmconfirmation
is classified under the full or
sources
for
wh
partial control of aof
particular
stockholderrecor
if
aggregation
these

discussed in the network control section.

that holder meets one of these criteria:
Full Control

(a) Stockholder has the largest holding, this

Direct Corporate Control

holding
is -largest
10%, and
no other holding is 60%
of the
holding.
Dominant forms of corporate control through(b) Stockholder has the largest holding, this
stockholding are evaluated by classifying each
holding
- 5%,
stockholder
has strong
sentationison
the company's
board,
and norepreof the agribusiness firms under eight categories of direct control based on the identity of
other
holding
is - 5%.
Partial
Control
the leading stockholder(s) and the strength of

its stockholding(s). The categories of control (a) Stockholder has the largest holding, this

are as follows:

holding
is -largest
10%, and
another holding(s) is 60%
of the
holding.
Full owner. Control is held by an individual,

a family, or a group of individuals (e.g., a part-

(b) Stockholder has a holding - 4% and no
nership). This category includes privately held
other
holding isis -not
10%.4
(c) Stockholder
the largest holder but
Partial owner. Shared control is held by one
has a holding > 60% of the largest holding

firms.

or more owners.

over 10%.

Full financial. Control is heldBased
by a
onbank,
the identity of the holder (e.g.,
financial
institution), the firm is then
insurance company, or otherfamily,
financial
in-

stitution.

placed into one of the eight categories listed
Partial financial. Shared control
is held
above.
Strongby
representation is defined as
one or more financial institutions.
having two people on the board of directors or
Miscellaneous. Control is held by a nonfione person serving on the board's finance or
nancial firm outside the agribusiness sample.executive committee. Representation is used
This category also includes one case of churchto qualify the strength of smaller holdings

control.

rather than to measure network control as in

Mixed. Shared control is held by more than
one of the above types of stockholders.
Cooperative. Control is jointly held by the
members of the cooperative.
No-identified-center-of-control. Firm does

the following section. Under these definitions,

The label "no-identified-center-of-control" is

mate control over the set of connected firms.

full control can be held by only one stockholder while partial control may be held by
more than one. Firms that are controlled by

other companies in the agribusiness sample
not fall into any of the above categories. are classified according to who exercises ulti-

more accurate than the commonly used "man- Stockholdings of 4%-10% or even 20% may
agement control" because as a residual this
seem too small to imply corporate control.
category also includes firms where centers of However, because of the wide dispersion of
control exist but were not discovered because
stockholding in large corporations, such levels
of a lack of information.
of holdings are considered to imply a control
The criteria for categorizing firms under one

of the above types of direct control are

capability (Kotz, Burch, Schulman). Recent

experience with takeover attempts, particu-

adapted from those Kotz used in studying con- larly in the oil industry, underscores the threat
trol over the top 200 nonfinancial corporations to corporate management of control over
in the United States. They rely on a combina- holdings of these sizes. The federal governtion of the identity of the leading stockhold- ment's routine reporting requirements for acer(s), the size of the leading stockholding(s), cumulations of stock in a company also recogwhether the stockholder(s) has seats on the nize a 5% holding as a benchmark.
board of directors, and the relative size and
The pattern of direct control in the agdistribution of other holdings in the firm. The ribusiness sector in late 1976 is presented in
criteria distinguish between full and partial

control. Full control presumably gives the

stockholder unchallenged direction over the
corporation, while partial control indicates a
strong but shared voice in corporate decision

4 A 4% rather than a 5% lower limit on stockholding size is used
for partial control in order to include holdings kept just under 5%.
This avoids the stock-trading reporting requirements that become
effective at the 5% level.
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Table
Type

Direct

1.

of

1987

Direct

Amer.

of

Agr.

Stockholder

Number

Control

J.

Firms

Firms

Assetsa

Econ.

Control

o

Assets

(%) ($ millions) (%)

1. Full owner 95 42.8 77,931.2 32.7
2. Partial owner 17 7.7 14,541.0 6.1
3. Full financial 6 2.7 8,215.5 3.4
4. Partial financial 18 8.1 32,234.8 13.5

5.

Agr.

cooperatives

27

12.2

6,447.9

2.7

6. Miscellaneous 5 2.3 2,237.4 0.9
7.
Mixed
11
5.0
3,868.7
1.6
8. No-identified-center 43 19.4 92,805.9 38.9
Total

222

Summary

Owner (1 +
Financial (3

100.0

of

238,282.4

100.0

Control

2) 112 50.5 92,472.2 38.8
+ 4) 24 10.8 40,450.3 17.0

Agr. cooperatives (5) 27 12.2 6,447.9 2.7
Miscellaneous or mixed (6 + 7) 16 7.2 6,106.1 2.6
No-identified-center (8) 43 19.4 92,805.9 38.9
Total

222

a
Asset
Largest

100.0

238,282.4

100.0

figures
are
from
Stock
Owne
U.S.
Food
and
Tobacco
Firms
(C

17
of
which
were
owner
controlled,
by
a
the
estimated
firm's
operating
revenues

center-of-control of 40.3%.

cantly larger than owner controlled firms.
table 1. The top portion categorizes the firms
Cooperatives are significantly smaller than
by type of control. The lower portion of the
table summarizes these findings into five catefirms under the other three types of direct control. The miscellaneous and mixed category is
gories. Full and partial owner control account
for 112 firms or 50.5% of the number of firms.excluded from this and subsequent tests because
The category no-identified-center-of-control
is it includes diverse control situations for
which group averages are not meaningful.
next in importance with 43 firms (19.4%). FiAllowing for differences in control criteria,
nancial and cooperative contol have similar
paired comparisons of these results to those of
importance accounting for 10.8% and 12.2%,
Schulman, Herman, Kotz, and Burch show
respectively. Miscellaneous and mixed control account for the remaining 7.2% of firms.
similar distributions of control types for those
Owner and no-identified-center-of-control
agribusiness firms included in both studies.5
Major differences appear, however, in overall
have equal importance when percentage of assets in each category is considered. Thus distributions of control types between some of
the studies. For samples of the largest 200
owner control is less important in terms of assets held than number of firms (39% versus
nonfinancial firms in 1974 and 1969, respec51%), while firms with no-identified-center-of-tively, Herman and Kotz found a much higher
incidence of firms with management or nocontrol are much more important in assets
identified-center-of-control and a much lower
held than number of firms (39% versus 19%).
incidence of owner control than is found here.
Financially controlled firms are also more imThis
portant in assets controlled than in number of difference can be attributed to the smaller
size of the majority of the firms in the agfirms (17% versus 11%). Miscellaneous,
ribusiness sample. In contrast, Burch's study
mixed, and cooperatively controlled firms are
of the top 500 industrials in 1965, which inless important in assets controlled than in
number of firms. This evidence of size differcluded a comparable range of firm sizes, found
ences between firms under the various typesa similar overall distribution of control types.
of direct control is supported by t-tests. These
tests (not reported here) show that the mean
5 The agribusiness sample has 38 firms in common with Hersize of firms with no-identified-center-ofman, 41 with Kotz, and 90 with Burch. Schulman used the same
control and financially controlled firms are not
sample and his overall distribution of control types is similar to
that found here.
significantly different, while both are signifi-
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These comparisons where
indicate
that
among
agrij is intensity of
the link between
firm i
andj, cj is centrality of firmj, and N is number
of firms in network. The weights allow for
the sample owner control is likely to be the
links with different degrees of importance. A
predominant form of direct control. A similar
highly interconnected firm has a relatively
relationship between distributions of firm size
high centrality score (e.g., Chase Manhattan).
and control type could be expected in other
sectors of the economy. In the agribusinessA link to a high scoring firm ties a firm more
sector, the dominant forms of direct stockclosely into the network than a link to a low
scoring firm (e.g., First National Bankholding control among large firms are owner

ribusiness firms smaller than those included in

and no-identified-center-of-control. The ma-

Akron). This disproportionate effect is

reflected as a higher centrality score for the
jority of these firms are under owner control,
firm.
while the largest have no-identified-center-ofcontrol. If those firms with no-identifiedThe data used to measure the intensity of
center are all under management control,
then
linkage
(r1j) between two firms are the records
of company-to-company interlocks through
about 40% of the sector's economic activity
takes place in firms where management common
is free board membership described above
in the data section. These records are agfrom direct control. This decision-making
freedom is tempered, however, by control ex-gregated to yield two measures of the intensity
ercised through board representation by out-of intercompany links. Each measure in turn
siders with a minor or no stockholding interest defines a separate network. In the first, the full
in the firm. This second avenue of control is
addressed in the next section.

network, rij is defined as
bij

Network Corporate Control

where bij is number of board members in common, di is number of members on board of firm

The practice of officers and directors of one
i, and dj is number of members on board of
corporation or institution sitting on the board
firm j. The number of interlocking directors

of another establishes a network of contacts

between the two firms is in the numerator,
between them. The degree of outside influence
while the denominator controls for the poten-

or control over a firm is based on the number

tial number of interlockers from each firm.6

and stength of their contacts. In this section,
The full network centrality score of a firm
centrality scores are calculated for each of the
based on this definition of rij is a measure of

455 firms in the network as indexes of control

the number and intensity of all its board links
through board representation. This measure to other firms.
was developed for analyzing interlocking di- In the strong directional network a second,

rectorates by researchers at SUNY-Stony more stringent definition of network influence
Brook (see, e.g., Bearden et al., Mariolis, is used for the rij measure. First, rij counts

Mizruchi, Mintz and Schwartz). In contrast to only board interlocks made by an officer of
the direct control results, this application ofone of the interlocked corporations. These
network analysis does not link individual firms strong officer ties represent a conscious decito specific centers of control; rather it mea-sion by the two corporations to establish a forsures a firm's exposure to outside influences.mal link. In contrast, ties made by non-officers
Under the SUNY-Stony Brook model, the may simply reflect the tendency of some indicentrality scores for the firms in the networkviduals to sit on multiple boards.
are calculated by a set of 455 simultaneous Second, rij is defined so that the firm sendequations, one for each firm. A firm's cen-ing the interlock (the officer's home firm) gets
trality is a weighted summation of the inten-most of the increase in centrality scores due to
sity of its board interlocks with other firmsthe link; the receiving firm gets the balance.
where the weights are the centrality scores of
the interlocking firms. The general form of the
6 Theoretically,
r0 ranges
from
0 (no interlocks)
1 (identical
boards).
However, the
maximum
number
of commontoboard
memcentrality measure for firm i is
N

Ci i#j= rij * cj,
j= 1

bersthe
(bo)strong
counted
between firms
wasthat
3 for
the fullThis
network
and 1.5
for
directional
network
follows.
modification
arises from rare cases in which an unusually high number of inter-

locks between a pair of companies gives them exaggerated cen-

trality scores.
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Table
Type

of

2.

1987

Amer.

Network

J.

Agr.

Econ.

Characteristics

of

Interlocked Isolates Centrality

Total

Direct Control Number Number Percenta Number Percenta Mean S.D.b
Full Network:
Owner

105

Financial

76

23

Cooperative

72.4

23

25

11

No-identified-center
Miscellaneous
Mixed
11
8
Total

212

Strong

29

100.0

44.0

43

27.6

0

0.0

14

40

93.0

76.9

49

3

10

No-identified-center

Mixed
Total

a
b

11

212

8

.001

7.0

23.1

Directional

Miscellaneous

.088

56.0

.137

.002
.186

40.0

43

38

.060

.107

Network:

Owner 105 62 59.0 43 41.0
Financial
23
22
95.7
1
4.3

25

.055

.107

5 5 100.0 0 0.0 .041 .032
72.7
3
27.3
.034
.049

163

Cooperative

.035

15

88.4

.029

.079

.101

.110

60.0
5

.006

11.6

.111

.014
.205

5

5 100.0 0 0.0 .038 .064
72.7
3
27.3
.082
.243

145

68.4

67

31.6

.054

.131

Row percentage.
Standard deviation.

definition
left side by
recognizes
a constant A, does not violate the th
spirit of the model and allows a solution to the
between the two corporations. Thus, both the
equations. The system XC = RC is solved by
strength and direction of each tie are considfinding eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Here, h
is chosen to equal the largest eigenvalue; the
ered in assessing a firm's exposure to outside
influence. The denominator again controls for
elements of its related eigenvector are the cenboard size.
trality scores.' Since the system has one more
unknown than equations, the actual values of
Formally, in the strong directional network
the centrality scores are arbitrary. The scores
rij is defined as
This

the interlock indicates the flow of influence

are chosen so that the most central firm has a

score of 1.0; therefore, the scores range from 0

Ws * Si + W, * Tij
rijr

i

to 1.0.

Data on the number of interlocked versus
is
isolatednumber
companies among the 212 ag- of
board
offirms
firm
(se
ribusiness
in the network as well j
as

where

Sij

on
officers

of
firm
j inwh
mean centrality
scores are presented
table 2

(receiving),
Ws
w
by type of direct
control. For theis
full network,
weight
of
receiver,
an
interlocking occurs among 100% of the

ing
Bearden
et
al.
financially controlled
firms,
93% of the and
firms
weights
are
set
at
.9
with no-identified-center-of-control,
72% of
The
455
centrality
the owner-controlled firms, and 44% of the eq
two
networks
compr
equations
in
the
matr
C = RC

where C is an N x 1 vector of centrality

scores and R is an N x N correlation matrix

of the full or strong directional overlap

7 There will be as many other eigenvectors with the same sign as
there are other discrete components of the network (i.e., groups of

firms that are related to each other but are not related to the main

cluster of firms); however, these eigenvectors are not used in the
analysis. Firms in the main cluster represented by the first eigenvector will have positive centrality scores, while those firms that
meabelong to other clusters or that are isolates (are related to no firms)

willor
have scores of 0. Bonacich's proof of this approach is for
sure rj. The system of equations C = RC,
symmetric R matrices. Following procedures developed by Bear(R - I)C = 0, has a nonzero solution only
den et al. and Mizruchi, the approach was applied to the asymunder the unlikely condition that det(R - I)
metric R matrix in the strong directional network on the basis of
its acceptable accuracy in calculating centrality scores.
= 0. But Bonacich shows that multiplying the
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network influence.
Cooperative
board memcooperatives.8 The firms
with
no-identified
bership isthe
generallyhighest
limited to the farmers
who
center-of-control have
mean
cen
own the cooperative,
provide
its capital,
and
trality score (.137) followed
by
the
financial
controlled firms (.107).
The
use its services,
and owner-controlle
to cooperative managers
firms have a much and
lower
mean
advisors. This
limitationscore
suggests low(.035),
while the cooperatives'
score
near 0
levels of mean
interlocking and
centralityis
scores.

Both the number of interlocked firms and

Firms with no-identified-center-of-control

mean centrality scores follow the same pattern
represent the reverse of this hypothesis. In
in the strong directional network. The lower
these firms, weak direct control likely is assopercentages of interlocked firms reflect ciated
the with strong network control. These
greater selectivity of this network.
firms lack the protection from interference
provided by a large controlling stockholder.
They are likely to depend more on the opinion
Relationship between Network and Direct
of the investment community for the mainteControl

nance of their stock prices and on large

These results show several marked differences in number of interlocked firms and mean

financial firms for the provision of their debt

capital. The price of such support is often

board representation and a voice in decision
centrality scores by type of direct control.
making. Thus, agribusiness companies with
How do these results clarify and qualify the
no-identified-center-of-control are expected to
findings reported above on dominant forms of
have higher levels of interlocking with firms in
direct control for agribusinesses? Recall that
the network and higher centrality scores.
the majority of large agribusiness firms are
Financially controlled firms are under the
under direct owner control, while the largest
strong direct control of financial institutions
have no-identified-center-of-control. Earlier
studies have concluded from similar evidence

that are members of the network of firms

studied. Any board representation resulting
that an important segment of large firms are
from this direct control is reflected at the net-

independent of outside control and are, in

work level in interlock counts and centrality
fact, management controlled (Burch, Larner,
scores. Because of this effect, financially conBerle and Means). In this section, the extent
trolled firms are expected to have higher cenof that independence is explored.
trality scores than companies under the other
In general, it is hypothesized that strong
types of strong direct control. In addition,
forms of direct control are associated with
weak network control and vice versa. To illus-

financial firms themselves tend to have rela-

trate: owner control, which is strong directtively high scores. Given the weighted computation of centrality scores, links to these firms
control, likely is associated with weak net-

will tend to contribute proportionately more to
work control for two reasons. First, the ownthe scores of firms subject to financial control.
ers who control the board selection process

Thus, these firms are expected to be an interwill tend to appoint outside directors who repmediate case with strong direct and network
resent the owners' interests. Second, these
control.
firms are less vulnerable to pressure for board
Two approaches are used to test the general
representation from outsiders who control imhypothesis. The first employs a series of tportant resources, especially capital. This
lower vulnerability is due to the owners' abil- tests to compare mean centrality scores between pairs of direct control types in each of
ity to control the firm's policies, including the
the two networks. From the above discussion,
internal generation of equity capital. Thus, the

outside directors of owner-controlled firms are

firms with no-identified-center-of-control are

less likely to be associated with the large expected to have higher mean centrality (and

thus greater network control) than the other
financial firms and others that make up the
network within which interlocking is mea- three types. Financially controlled firms are
sured. As a result, low levels of interlocking expected to have higher centrality scores
than owner and cooperatively controlled comand centrality scores are expected.
panies.
No hypothesis is made about the relaThe cooperative form also implies strong ditive
centrality
scores of owner and cooperarect control and likely is associated with weak
tively controlled firms.

8 Mixed and miscellaneous controlled firms are again excluded
from the analysis.

The results of these tests are presented in
table 3. Four out of the five comparisons are

18 February 1987 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.

Table 3. T-Ratios for
Comparison
these scores
should be independentof
of theMean
size

factor.
Centrality Scores between
Direct Control Types

for Large Agribusiness
Firms,
1976
A subsample
of 154 of
the 212 agribusiness
firms included in the network analysis is used
Strong

Full Directional

in the regressions. Of the 58 excluded firms, 16

are under mixed or miscellaneous control, 25

Pair of Control Types Compared Network Network
No-identified-center/financial .89 .25
No-identified-center/owner 3.52**a 2.54*

No-identified-center/cooperative 4.80** 3.33**
Financial/owner 3.74** 3.66**

Financial/cooperative 5.78** 4.11**

are cooperatives, and 17 are privately held

firms under owner control. Among the latter
two groups, centrality scores are uniformly
low regardless of size. The total assets of private firms, for example, range from $33 mil-

lion to $2,900 million, while their full network

centrality scores range from 0.0 to 0.07 (on a
scale of 0-1). Since there is little variability in
Note: All tests are one tail.
scores among these firms, they are omitted
a Double asterisk indicates significant at the 0.17% level.
Using
from
the analysis in order to provide a clearer
the Bonferroni procedure, this yields a 1% overall significance
test of the effect of size on level of centrality
level for the family of six t-tests for each network; single asterisk
indicates significant at the 0.83% level. Using the Bonferroni
pro-The 154 firms in the subsample are all
scores.
cedure, this yields a 5% overall significance level for the family of
public
including 88 that are owner controlled,
six t-tests for each network.
Owner/cooperative 6.39** 2.77*

23 financially controlled, and 43 with no

identified center of control.

as expected in both networks. While firms

with no-identified-center-of-control do not

The dependent variable in the regressions is
the firm's centrality score in either the full or

have significantly higher scores than finanstrong directional network. This score ranges

from 0 to 1. The results indicated that the varicially controlled firms in either network, their

scores are significantly higher than thoseance
of of centrality scores was unequal between
owner- and cooperatively controlled firms. firms
Fi- under the three types of direct control.
To stabilize the variance and correct for this
nancially controlled firms, in turn, have

significantly higher scores than owner- and
problem, a logarithm to the base 10 transforcooperatively controlled firms in both netmation was applied to the centrality scores

works. A final test indicates that owner-

(Mizruchi, pp. 109-37). The resulting scores

controlled firms have significantly higher for
cen-the transformed full (FCENTL) and strong

trality scores than cooperatives. These tests
directional (SDCENTL) networks range from
0 to
4.9
provide broad support for the hypothesis
that
weak direct control is associated with strong
The independent variables are firm size and

network control. This overall relationship
type of direct control. Size (RLOGAST) is

holds for both the full and strong directional
measured as the reciprocal of the logarithm to
thenot
base 10 of total assets in 1976 measured in
networks indicating that the results are

sensitive to network definition.

millions of dollars (Hall and Weiss).to Since
The above approach does not control for centrality scores are expected to be positively

differences in sizes of agribusiness firms under associated with firm size and assets appear in

the various types of direct control. Recall thatthe denominator, RLOGAST is hypothesized
to have a negative coefficient.
financially controlled firms are larger than
As discussed earlier, financially controlled

firms with no-identified-center-of-control and

owner- and cooperatively controlled firms.firms and firms with no-identified-center-ofSize may be important in explaining differingcontrol are hypothesized to have higher cencentrality scores because previous studies trality scores than owner-controlled firms.
have shown a positive relationship betweenFour variables were formed to test this hyfirm size and degree of interlocking (Warnerpothesis. A financial control dummy (FINand Unwalla, Dooley, Allen). To assess the
importance of this effect, a second approach 9 The transformation is
to testing the general hypothesis is based on FCENTL, SDCENTL = log0o ((10,000 * CENTRALITY) + 1).
regressions relating centrality scores to type
of direct control and size of firm. Size is ex-

See also Neter and Wasserman (p. 507).
10 The results for regressions using operating revenues as the
were virtually identical to those reported here for

pected to have a positive effect on centrality
size variable
assets.
scores, but the effect of direct control type on
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DUM) and a dummy (NOIDDUM) for no-

at the 5% level. Thus, differences remain in
full network centrality scores by type of conassess whether the intercept term differs betrol even after controlling for size. The results

identified-center-of-control were created to

are mixed when the size coefficient is allowed
tween the direct control types. Positive
coefficients on both these variables are hy-to differ between control types in regression
pothesized reflecting the higher levels of cen-(3). The coefficient on FINDUM is positive

trality scores expected for these control typesbut insignificant, while the coefficient on
compared to owner control. To assess
FINDUM * RLOGAST is negative and
whether the size coefficient differed among
insignificant. The negative coefficient on
the control types, variables for financialNOIDDUM
conis contrary to the hypothesis. The
trol/size (FINDUM * RLOGAST) and no
NOIDDUM * RLOGAST coefficient is posiidentified center of control/size (NOIDDUM
tive*and significant, indicating a lower slope

RLOGAST) were created. No hypothesis for
is firms with no identified center of control

made on the signs of these two variables.versus those with owner control. Taken toThree models were tested for each network:
gether, the three regressions for the full network suggest that size is very important in
(1) FCENTL, SDCENTL
explaining differences in centrality scores
= a + b1 RLOGAST
between public firms; type of direct control is
also significant.
(2) FCENTL, SDCENTL
The results for the strong directional net= a + b1 RLOGAST + b2 FINDUM
work reported in regressions (4)-(6) are simi+ b3 NOIDDUM
lar. Size is again a highly significant explana(3) FCENTL, SDCENTL
tory variable in all three equations. The two
= a + b1 RLOGAST + b2 FINDUM control dummies are positive and significant
+ b3 NOIDDUM
when introduced alone but negative and
insignificant when interaction terms between
+ b4 (FINDUM * RLOGAST)
control type and size are included. Neither of
+ b5 (NOIDDUM * RLOGAST).
the interaction terms is significant. Thus, alThe results are reported in table 4.
lowing for differences in slope and intercept
Size is highly significant in explaining differleads to an overall finding of no difference in
ences in centrality scores for public firms in all
centrality scores between firms with different
six regressions. For the full network, regrestypes of direct control in both networks. How-

sion (1) shows that the size variable alone exever, the regressions that include only dumplains a substantial amount of variance. When
mies for control show a modest difference by
control type. These results indicate that size is
the control dummies are added in regression,
(2), both variables are positive and significant
the important factor in explaining differences
Table 4. Regression Relationship Between Centrality, Direct Control Type, and Asset Size for
Public Firms, 1976
Independent Variables

Dependent

FINDUM*

NOIDDUM*

Variable CONSTANT RLOGAST FINDUM NOIDDUM RLOGAST RLOGAST 2 F-value
1)

FCENTL 4.76**a -6.96** .26 55.11**
(.36)b (.94)
2) FCENTL 4.29** -6.18** .52* .35* .28 21.10**
(.41) (.98) (.23) (.19)
3) FCENTL 4.77** -7.38** .55 -1.40 -.26 4.94* .30 13.91**
4)

(.52) (1.28) (1.00) (.85) (2.69) (2.32)

SDCENTL

4.38**

(.41) (1.08)

-

7.22**

.22

44.85**

5) SDCENTL 3.68** - 6.08** 1.07** .41* .30 22.51**
(.45) (1.09) (.26) (.21)
6) SDCENTL 4.18** -7.34** - .40 - .45 4.00 2.32 .30 13.93**

(.58) (1.43) (1.12) (.95) (3.01) (2.60)

a Double asterisk indicates significant at 1% level; single asterisk indicates
b Standard errors are reported in parentheses below regression coefficien
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in centrality scores
public
f
control with among
cooperatives showing
little conthough significant
differences
by ty
nection through
board membership to other
trol appear to exist
as in
well.
centers of power
the nationalThe
economy. sim
the regression results
between
the
This lack of connection
is much greater than
works indicates that the network definition
that of owner-controlled firms. The largest
firms in the sector lack direct control but show
does not have an important impact for this
sample of firms.
much higher levels of exposure to network
The two approaches taken together provide
control. For these top firms network-based
broad support for the general hypothesiscontrol
that appears to take the placeof direct conweak direct control is associated with strong
trol by owners." Financially controlled firms
network control and vice versa, with size
be- a unique secondary class of control with
form
ing an important underlying factor. These
re- strong direct and network control.
both
sults clarify and qualify the earlier findings on
Two points emerge from this article to guide
dominant forms of direct control among research
large
on the effects on firm performance
firms in the agribusiness sector. Over 60%
andof
aggregate concentration of patterns of
the firms in this study have strong direct concorporate control over large firms in the agand other sectors. First, considertrol without any substantial network ties.ribusiness
The
owner- and cooperatively controlled firmsing
that
patterns of direct control through stockmake up this group appear to be relatively
in- will not offer a comprehensive picture
holding
dependent decision makers. Corporate control
of who controls firm decision making. Eviis largely internal to the firm, and managedence presented here, for example, indicates
ment's policy parameters are set by the that
con-by 1976 management control rather than
trolling stockholders.
strong direct stockholder control was predomThe nearly 20% of the agribusiness firms
inant among the largest firms in the agthat lack any center of direct control have
the
ribusiness
sector. However, this weak direct
highest levels of exposure to network control.
control was accompanied by strong outside
These include the larger firms in the sector.
In
network
control. Thus, managerial control apthese firms, the ability of management to
set to encourage overall coordination in the
pears
its own course appears to be limited bysector
the rather than being a decentralizing facstrength of outside interests represented
on Alternatively, both public- and private
tor.
the board. Depending on the relative power
of
owner-controlled
firms along with cooperamanagement and outside interests, the locus
tives are more independent decision-making
of control in these corporations may be intercenters. Research emphasizing the quality of
nal, external, or shared. Leaving aside firm-level
the
decision making must address the
of both direct and network control.
10% that are mixed or miscellaneously structure
con-

trolled, the final 10% of the agribusiness comSecond, the structure of corporate control,
panies are under strong direct control in
bythe agribusiness sector at least, is depenfinancial firms coupled with high levels of netdent on firm size. Size was the major factor in
work involvement. In these special cases,
explaining the type of direct control and the
both forms of control are externally centered
level of network involvement. Larger firm size

in a financial firm. For all the direct control

is related to looser forms of direct control but

extensive network influence. This imtypes considered, data on network control more
is
most important in clarifying and qualifying the
plies greater centralization of decision making
nature of corporate control in firms that have
as firms grow to larger sizes.

no-identified-center of direct control.

Conclusions

[Received August 1985; final revision
received April 1986.]
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